After three years of open warfare the Korean Conflict concluded with a stalemate in July 1953. That means that next year will mark the sixtieth year since hostilities ended. The Chinese-backed Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) remained communist; the US-backed Republic of Korea remained in the South. The greatest powers for democracy and communism drew a draw. For fear of another invasion, the United States left forces in the peninsula. Decades later the tensions remain, but the risk of a Chinese invasion declined until today when there is little likelihood that either China or the US would launch any invasion across the demilitarized zone. Nevertheless, a formal state of war still exists. Of course if you watch the news on North Korea's latest missile test mishap it is obvious that the DPRK is ever less a threat to South Korea, and certainly no threat to the United States. One fun fact is that the DPRK faces such extensive malnutrition that they just dropped the minimum height requirement for military service to 4'9. A few inches won't make you shoot a gun any more accurate, but it is still hard to imagine the average DPRK soldier as an intimidating foe.
As I sat in my office today I pondered the many ways the US could cut its budget and eventually my mind turned to our bases in South Korea. Do we really need those bases? Are we really afraid of the North Koreans? What threat could the DPRK possibly offer to us that requires the tens of thousands of soldiers stationed in Korea and the billions of dollars we spend there each year? I resolved to look into it further.
In a recent article published by the Foreign Policy in Focus think tank, authors Christine Ahn and Sukjong Hong provide a variety of helpful facts in analyzing this issue. The full text of their article can be found here. Below I've included a few highlights.
In 2010, the United States spent $41.6 billion on its 662 official foreign soil bases (plus more piles of cash on hundreds of other temporary bases). The US has 70 permanent bases in South Korea where 25,000 men are stationed. These Korean bases cost American taxpayers somewhere between $15 and $20 billion each year.
It is even more interesting to note that there is significant civilian opposition to the US bases, and to the continual expansion of those bases. The Cato institute found that between 1988 and 1996, American soldiers in Korea committed an average of two crimes each day. Additionally, as bases expanded, local people resisted dispossession. The best example is that in 2007 some 94% of the people of Gangjeong voted to oppose a new US base only to suffer significant government pressures. Eventually farmers sold out and in 2009 Korea approved the construction. This is only the latest example of uprooting villages for bases, and there is growing resentment in Korea.
So if the threat to United States citizens is nearly non existent, and many Koreans don't even want us there, why is the United States is spending $20 billion/year to maintain and staff these bases? There are several answers; the first relates to international security. Tim Shorrock's book Spies for Hire argues that several bases, particularly Pyeongtaek and Osan, serve as hubs for international surveillance activity. The US only has to respect the privacy of US citizens, and those bases are valuable centers for easedropping on North Korea, as well as South Korea, China, Vietnam, and other Asian nations.
Furthermore, the former commander of US forces in Korea Commander Generall B.B. Bell explained that South Korea is also a center of trade and commerce that the US must protect for our own economic interests. He said, “Twenty-five percent of the world’s trade flows through northeast Asia. Whether it’s Korea, Japan, or China, if you’re trading in the world, one out of every four things you trade, commodity-wise and dollar-wise, is going through that area.” Bases in Korea allow the US to protect international economic interests, he says.
The final argument for maintaining Korean bases is simply for a quick response to any threats by China or anybody else in the Pacific. We need to be ready and able to respond on a moments notice.
All three of these justifications for maintaining the bases have merit, but I can't help but question the need for such extensive entanglement. Do we really need 70 bases and 25,000 men at a cost of $20 billion/year just to spy and protect our economic interests? My guess is that a couple bases and a couple thousand men could do the job just fine.
In a time when we must choose between cutting healthcare and education, maybe its time to cut a few dozen excess bases in Pacific. We already spend as much money on our military as the rest of the world combined, and I really doubt the loss of a few bases and soldiers in South Korea will lessen our economic or military security. North Korea can't even effectively threaten South Korea, and is really no threat at all to American soil.
